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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS OF DIASPORA 
 
The great euphoria about the diaspora concept1 is certainly over.2 While in the 
1980s and especially the 1990s “diaspora” was eagerly adopted as an antidote 
against the “metaphysics of ‘race’, nation and bounded culture”, in Paul Gilroy’s 
words (Gilroy 1997: 328), and experienced ever increasing popularity, the con-
cept evoked more cautious and critical voices in the last decade. In the discours-
es of social sciences and cultural studies, “diaspora” has been mostly used as a 
term for a “social form” among the three meanings of the concept which Steve 
Vertovec (1997) identified. In fact, in many cases “diaspora” has been plainly 
employed as another term for (migrant) community. This usage of “diaspora” has 
                                                           
1  When I started to develop an interest in diaspora – at that time in the Alevi case – 
Waltraud Kokot provided the intellectually stimulating environment at the Department 
of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Hamburg University, where I could pursue this 
interest. I am greatly indebted to Waltraud Kokot for her huge support. 
2  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Stockholm, Oslo, 
Bielefeld, Tübingen and Zagreb. The discussions after these presentations helped very 
much to improve the paper. I would like to express my gratitude to the Wenner-Gren 
Foundation for Anthropological Research which generously funded fieldwork in Brit-
ain and in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Fieldwork consisted of eight field trips to Brit-
ain between 2006 and 2010 of two to six weeks duration each. I worked mainly in 
Bradford, Greater Manchester, Birmingham and London with Kashmiri activists of 
secular-nationalist orientation. Around two months of research in Azad Kashmir and 
Pakistan took place mainly in 2007. 
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been criticised and it has been argued that, instead of subverting, such a concept 
rather bolsters the “metaphysics” of nation, ethnic group and bounded culture 
(e.g. Anthias 1998, Soysal 2001). Brian Axel (2001) in particular pointed to the 
role of ideas of “origin” in this context. Especially the practice of tying diasporas 
to some place of origin (e.g. Safran 1991) – as in the usual practice of naming 
diasporas after a presumed provenance – strengthens the metaphysics of bound-
edness. Axel argued that diaspora should not be thought from some place of 
origin, but rather from the space in which it unfolds. Some diasporas, like the 
Sikhs who serve as Axel’s example, create their particular “home” and “origin” 
from the diasporic vantage point, rather than carrying it already with them on 
their routes of migration. Accordingly, diaspora is not the result of some original 
or ongoing migration, but of a broader range of social and political processes. 
The critique of essentialisation notwithstanding, diaspora very often contin-
ues to be treated as a social entity and a collective actor. A prominent example 
for this is Gabriel Sheffer’s book Diaspora politics (Sheffer 2003). At first sight, 
Sheffer seems to avoid an essentialist conceptualisation of diaspora as an entity. 
He poses the question of how and why migrants form diasporas and thus goes 
beyond the simple assumption that diasporas are a direct outcome of migration. 
Yet once established, diasporas appear to be communities and collective actors 
who “do” something politically, who, for instance “extend support to belea-
guered homelands and other diaspora communities of the same national origin” 
(p. 26). Significantly, Sheffer conceptualises diasporas in terms of maintenance 
of identities. Thus, diasporas continue because of their “members’ wishes to 
maintain their ethno-national identities and contacts with their homeland and 
with other dispersed communities of the same ethnic origin” (ibid.). Sheffer 
acknowledges the role of diaspora organisations and also of the context of the 
“host country” in the constitution of diaspora. Still, according to him, all this on-
ly helps to actualise what essentially seems to be already there: “[…] a degree of 
cohesion emerges within those [migrant] groups. Again, solidarity and group co-
hesion are founded on the primordial, cultural and instrumental elements in their 
collective identities” (ibid., p. 80). Established on such “foundational” elements, 
diasporas are considered as acting collectively, in quite a similar way that we 
colloquially use to refer to the acts (or interests, experiences, etc.) of nations or 
states. In Sheffer’s book phrases like “diasporas engage in” or “pursue” some-
thing abound; diasporas “achieve” their goals – or do not achieve them. I regard 
this way of talking about diaspora as inherently problematic. Although Sheffer 
does not consider diaspora explicitly as a simple outcome of migration, diaspora 
is viewed in terms of pre-existing phenomena. This is a very common approach 
which assesses diasporas in terms of continuity and change in comparison with 
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the “home country”. Here, too, “origin” remains the constant reference and in 
spite of all changes something essential remains the same which, in the last in-
stance, allows us to name a certain diaspora after its presumed “origin”. Else-
where I have argued that such an approach is much too narrow and essentialising 
(Sökefeld 2004) and that diasporas cannot be meaningfully compared to some 
pristine state of origin before migration (which thereby becomes an entrenched 
“home”). Countering this approach I argued – following a social-constructionist 
approach to identity (e.g. Sökefeld 2008) – that identity is always imagined and 
practiced within a specific context, and that the imagination of a particular “iden-
tity of origin” (which itself needs to be contextualised) is only one factor among 
many that help to create particular discourses of identity. Thus, rather than tak-
ing for granted that a particular diaspora identity is “rooted” in a certain identity 
of origin, we need to consider why – if at all – the imagination of diasporic iden-
tity takes place in these particular terms. I suggested that the essentialisation of 
diaspora can be prevented by considering the formation of diaspora as a process 
of social and political mobilisation which can be analysed with concepts of so-
cial movement theory (Sökefeld 2006). Further, if diaspora is closely related to 
processes of mobilisation, diaspora can also be “de-mobilised” again. Diasporas 
may not only change but also fade away. In the rest of this article I will discuss 




THE KASHMIRI DIASPORA IN THE UK 
 
This text is about “the Kashmiri diaspora” in the UK. My interest in the Kash-
miri case was triggered by my earlier concern for the “political context of 
origin”3 which includes the Kashmir dispute.4 Thus my “route” towards the 
Kashmiris in the UK followed the rather conventional, “rooted” approach which 
I criticised above. When I started to do research about Kashmiris in Britain I was 
strongly influenced by the publications of Nasreen Ali, Zafar Khan and Patricia 
Ellis who studied Kashmiris in Luton in the 1990s. Luton is a small town north 
                                                           
3  I resort to this phrase for the purpose of avoiding to essentialise by simply naming the 
origin. In the case of the Kashmiris this problem is particularly pertinent, as we will 
see, because their “context of origin” is highly disputed and fragmented. 
4  I am highly interested in the Kashmir issue since I did fieldwork for my PhD thesis in 
Gilgit-Baltistan, the other part of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir State that is under the 
control of Pakistan. See for instance Sökefeld 2005. 
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of London with a large number of people originating from Kotli district in Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir (subsequently AJK). AJK, one of the two sections of erst-
while Jammu and Kashmir State (subsequently J&K State) which since 1947 are 
under Pakistani control, is the area of origin of almost all Kashmiris in Britain. 
From the articles by Ali, Khan and Ellis an image of a politically very active and 
quite close-knit Kashmiri diaspora community emerged. A community which 
has influenced British foreign policy has engaged in local elections and has also 
exerted considerable influence in AJK (Ellis and Khan 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 
2002). While Nasreen Ali argued more differentiated, pointing out, for instance, 
that there are different discourses of “Kashmiriness” which are authored by dif-
ferent kinds of actors (Ali 2002, 2003), the overall picture was that of diaspora 
as a collective political actor. While people of Kashmiri origin had been catego-
rised as “Pakistanis” before, also in academic publications,5 because AJK is un-
der Pakistani control, because they arrived on Pakistani passports and because 
Pakistan acts as “caretaker” for AJK, the authors argued that Kashmiris in Brit-
ain formed a separate ethnic/diasporic community and should be recognised as 
such. They emphasised that “migrants from Azad Kashmir and their offspring 
are identifying themselves first and foremost as Kashmiris” (Ali, Ellis and Khan 
1996: 230), giving other possible identifications lesser salience, but also that in 
the 1990s this was a quite recent change. According to their diagnosis, the 
change was triggered mostly by developments in the Indian administered part of 
J&K, namely the insurgency against Indian control which had started in 1989. 
They accorded a particularly significant role in this respect to the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the secular-nationalist Kashmiri organisation 
which started the insurgency in Indian J&K and which had originally been estab-
lished in 1977 in Birmingham by political activists from AJK. 
Having read these writings, I expected to find a vibrant Kashmiri diasporic 
community when I started fieldwork in Britain in 2006. As I was especially in-
terested in politics, I worked mostly with activists of different parties and organi-
sations. After more than four years of (intermittent) research, a different picture 
emerged. While for the political activists “Kashmiri” indeed is the first and 
foremost identification, this cannot be confirmed for the “community” at large. I 
encountered more failed projects than successful manifestations of the “Kashmiri 
diaspora”. While the term “diaspora” has entered the political vocabulary of 
Kashmiri activists, a Kashmiri diaspora in the sense of a community which iden-
tifies itself primarily as Kashmiri has apparently largely vanished – if it ever ex-
isted. On the other hand, the history of Kashmiri mobilisation in Britain turned 
                                                           
5  E.g. Anwar 1979, Ballard 1983, Bolognani 2007, Saifullah Khan 1977. 
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out to be much more complex. It cannot be reduced to the JKLF only.6 In this ar-
ticle I will outline a history of Kashmiri political mobilisation in Britain, consid-
ering first transnational politics, i.e. commitments that are related to issues in 
Kashmir, and then mobilisation related to British politics. After that I will dwell 
on failed Kashmiri projects. In the end I will offer some ideas towards a re-
conceptualisation of diaspora derived from the Kashmiri case. 
 
 
KASHMIRI MOBILISATION IN TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS 
 
Individual migration from what later became AJK started already before the 
Subcontinent’s partition and independence.7 From the 1950s, chain migration 
developed, transferring large portions of the population of southern AJK (today’s 
districts of Mirpur, Kotli and Bhimber), resulting in quite concentrated settle-
ments of Kashmiris in Britain, especially in Birmingham, Bradford, different 
towns in Lancashire and around London. It is regularly estimated that 500,000 
people of Kashmiri origin live in the UK (e.g. Ali 2003: 477).8 Sometimes even 
higher numbers are given. However, because “Kashmiri” is not a census catego-
ry in the UK, there are no exact and reliable figures. This is an important issue of 
political mobilisation, as will be seen later. 
Because there are close political relationships between AJK and Kashmiris in 
the UK, a few sentences about AJK politics are necessary in order to understand 
Kashmiri political mobilisation in Britain.9 The original idea of Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir was to create a democratic and independent J&K State, free of the Ma-
haraja’s feudal rule. After the turmoil of partition and in the course of the dispute 
between India and Pakistan over the accession of the princely state of J&K, 
                                                           
6  The JKLF itself is a very complex phenomenon. It has undergone a number of splits 
and mirrors the fragmentation of the “Kashmiri community”. 
7  The most detailed history of migration from AJK to the UK is given by Kalra 2000. 
8  Ellis and Khan estimated 350,000 persons of Kashmiri background in 1999 (Ellis and 
Khan 1999b: 103). Muzamil Khan assumed in 2006 that there were 400,000 people 
from Mirpur alone in the UK (Khan 2006: 43). 
9  By “Kashmiri political mobilisation” I mean all kinds of political activities that are re-
lated to ideas of Kashmir and Kashmiris (as state, nation, ethnic group, diaspora, etc.). 
There are other kinds of political activities by people who are categorised as “Kash-
miri” which I do not include in this category, such as many fields of British home af-
fairs but also politics of Islam. This distinction is necessary in order to de-essentialise 
“Kashmiris”: Not everything “Kashmiris” do is “Kashmiri”. 
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Azad (“Free”) Jammu and Kashmir was declared on 4th October 1947. There had 
been a brewing revolt against the Maharaja’s regime already since early 1947. In 
autumn of that year, “tribals” from Pakistan entered J&K in order to support the 
uprising. Feeling strongly threatened, the Maharaja declared accession with India 
on October 26, 1947, to allow the entering of Indian troops into the State. Thus, 
the conflict was turned into a war between India and Pakistan. After the ceasefire 
of the first Kashmir war, AJK emerged as a small strip at the south-western edge 
of erstwhile J&K State, separated from the Indian administered territory by the 
ceasefire line which was later renamed as Line of Control. Formally, AJK is a 
separate political body which today has a complete institutional setup including 
government, parliament and judiciary. De facto, however, AJK is almost com-
pletely dependent on and controlled by Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan is the only 
state which recognises AJK. For Pakistan, AJK serves as a kind of placeholder 
for the future accession of the whole J&K which is envisioned and demanded by 
the country as solution of the Kashmir dispute. The close relationship with Paki-
stan dominates formal politics in AJK. For instance, candidates for the AJK leg-
islative assembly are required to sign a declaration of loyalty with Pakistan say-
ing that they desire and support the accession of J&K with Pakistan. 
Yet not all people in and from AJK were and are content with this state of af-
fairs. The demand for independence of J&K enjoys considerable support al-
though it can hardly be freely articulated in AJK. A first milestone of political 
mobilisation in AJK against Pakistani control occurred in relation with the con-
struction of the Mangla Dam in Mirpur between 1959 and 1967. When the large 
reservoir was flooded, an estimated number of 100,000 people were displaced by 
the rising water. Resistance against the construction of the dam in Mirpur was 
supported by Mirpuris, as migrants from AJK were called at that time, in Britain. 
The protest against the dam was ruthlessly suppressed by the AJK and the Paki-
stani governments. One outcome of the protest campaign was the establishment 
of a pro-independence party in AJK, the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front 
(PF), in 1965. The PF campaigned for the implementation of a referendum about 
the future of Jammu and Kashmir, as provisioned by the UN resolutions on 
Kashmir. Yet in contrast with these resolutions, the PF demanded three options 
for a plebiscite: beside accession with India or Pakistan also the independence of 
J&K State. The PF had supporters among Kashmiris in Britain although there 
was hardly a formal party organisation in the UK. Yet, there was a potential for 
mobilisation: When in 1971, after the hijacking of an Indian aircraft from Srina-
gar to Lahore, large numbers of PF members and supporters were arrested in Pa-
kistan and AJK, sympathisers in Britain staged effective protests during visits of 
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members of the Pakistani government, exerting pressure which contributed to the 
release of the prisoners.10 
From the PF derives a first string of Kashmiri political mobilisation in Brit-
ain which can be termed secular-nationalist. After the hijacking the PF had ra-
ther difficult times in AJK due to close surveillance and pressure. As a conse-
quence, the idea emerged to establish an organised and powerful branch in Brit-
ain. In 1975, two party leaders came to the UK and in early 1977 they estab-
lished the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in Birmingham as an 
overseas support organisation for the PF. Yet later the president of the JKLF, 
Amanullah Khan, took the organisation back to Azad Kashmir and turned it into 
a rival of the PF. 
A second string of mobilisation can be termed leftist and internationalist. 
There was a small but very committed circle of Kashmiri activists in Britain who 
were influenced by the Palestinian struggle, the activism against the Vietnam 
War and other international issues. They conceived their activism in terms of an-
ti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. John Hutnyk (2006) issued a very committed 
statement for the inclusion of leftist politics in the writings about British South 
Asians, and such leftist politics did indeed play an important role in Kashmiri ac-
tivism.11 Leftist activists from Kashmir formed the United Kashmir Liberation 
Front (UKLF) in Birmingham in the early 1970s. The group joined the efforts of 
PF sympathisers in the aircraft hijacking case, although they did not share the 
overall aims of the PF, which they regarded as rather bourgeois. The UKLF co-
operated with other leftists from South Asia like the Indian Workers’ Association 
and the Pakistani Workers’ Association. After a few years, the UKLF was turned 
into the Kashmiri Workers’ Association (KWA). In contrast to the JKLF, the 
KWA developed strong links with British organisations like trade unions or anti-
racism initiatives. The KWA always remained a small group which nevertheless 
                                                           
10  The two hijackers from Indian administered J&K had some relations with activists of 
the PF in AJK. When they arrived in Lahore, they were first welcomed as freedom 
fighters. At that time, Pakistan still consisted of a western and an eastern part (which 
became Bangladesh soon after), separated by the land mass of northern India. In 
consequence of the hijacking incident, India closed its airspace for Pakistani aircrafts. 
Transport between West- and East Pakistan was interrupted. After this, the Pakistani 
government blamed the hijackers as “Indian agents” and put them along with many PF 
activists to a special trial. 
11  Leftist orientation among Kashmiris was not a product of the political context in Brit-
ain but played a role already in the political struggles of pre-1947 Jammu and Kash-
mir. 
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introduced a number of significant and influential changes in Kashmiri politics 
in the UK. For instance, activists of the KWA started to call AJK “Pakistan Oc-
cupied Kashmir” (POK) in analogy with the term “Indian Occupied Kashmir” 
(IOK) which is generally used in Pakistan to refer to the territories administered 
by India. Also, the KWA started to use Pahari, the regional language of Mirpur, 
in its public meetings instead of Urdu, Pakistan’s national language. The issue of 
language use is significant. “Mirpuris” were generally looked down upon by Pa-
kistanis in Britain as kind of backward “hillbillies”. Part of this negative stereo-
typing was their “Mirpuri” language which was considered as an unintelligible 
dialect of Punjabi and not as a language in its own right. Political activities of the 
KWA were clearly marked by opposition against Pakistani domination of AJK. 
Both the secular nationalists of PF and JKLF and the leftists of the KWA fa-
voured the independence of Kashmir. 
Both lines of mobilisation converged to some extent in 1984. At the begin-
ning of this year, activists from around the JKLF kidnapped Ravinder Mhatre, an 
Indian diplomat in Birmingham, with the intention to force the release of 
Maqbool Bhat in India. Maqbool Bhat was a leader of the Jammu and Kashmir 
National Liberation Front (NLF), a militant wing of the PF, who was on the 
death row in India, having been convicted of the murder of an Indian policeman. 
The kidnappers did not achieve their goal. Ravinder Mhatre was killed and 
Maqbool Bhat executed in Delhi. The date of Bhat’s execution, February 11, be-
came subsequently a significant day of commemoration and mobilisation for 
Kashmiri activists, marked by public events all over Britain. In 1984, the murder 
of the Indian diplomat sparked large-scale police crackdowns on politically ac-
tive Kashmiris in Britain. In this situation a leader of the JKLF called the KWA 
for assistance, although earlier there had been a lot of friction between both or-
ganisations. Now, the KWA mobilised its quite elaborate network of non-
Kashmiri, white British supporting organisations, mostly from the spectrum of 
campaigns against racism, framing the crackdown as a racist move. 
After 1984 the JKLF was able to recruit many more members. Branches 
were established in almost thirty cities in the UK. Although the killing of 
Ravider Mhatre was generally condemned among Kashmiris, the events brought 
much publicity and with the execution of Maqbool Bhatt the JKLF had won a 
martyr who became a focal symbol of identification. Yet the JKLF became never 
as strong as it perhaps could have been because it was ridden with internal con-
flicts. Moreover, the alliance with others like the KWA did not last. Today, there 
are several different factions of the JKLF. From the early 1990s, it became obvi-
ous that the JKLF had collaborated with Pakistani intelligence agencies in trig-
gering the insurgency in Indian administered J&K. Some Kashmiri activists in 
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Britain considered Pakistan simply as another occupying force in Kashmir and 
were very critical of such collaboration. Soon the JKLF became largely insignif-
icant to the struggle in Indian Kashmir because the Pakistani agencies shifted 
their support to Islamist groups. The secular-nationalist uprising in Indian ad-
ministered Kashmir largely turned out to be a failure (Sikand 2001). As a conse-
quence, many Kashmiris in Britain became disillusioned with the JKLF. 
 
 
KASHMIRIS IN BRITISH LOCAL POLITICS 
AND THE CENSUS CAMPAIGN 
 
From the late 1970s, people of AJK origin became involved in British local poli-
tics. In the British election system of strict majority vote minorities have much 
electoral weight. Being mostly labourers, the majority of people of Kashmiri 
background considered the Labour Party as their natural political representation. 
Increasingly, Kashmiris did not only vote for Labour candidates but demanded 
to stand for elections on Labour tickets themselves. One of the first Kashmiri 
councillors was Mohammad Ajeeb in Bradford, who in 1985 also became the 
first Lord Mayor of Kashmiri origin of a British city. British issues rather than 
anything connected with Kashmir were the most important reason to enter local 
politics. Mohammad Ajeeb’s motivation was the struggle against racism, espe-
cially in the context of employment, which first triggered his commitment to an-
ti-racist initiatives and trade unions and then brought him to the city council. The 
number of Kashmiri councillors grew in the 1980s and 1990s. While for many 
the experience of discrimination had already been the reason to enter local poli-
tics, the difficult social situation of Asian immigrants became even more appar-
ent through their involvement in the councils which gave access to social moni-
toring data. There was a perception that people of Kashmiri background were ac-
tually worse off in terms of housing, education, employment, etc. than other 
Asians, Pakistanis included. Statistically, however, Kashmiris remained invisible 
because statistics categorised Asians according to their nation-states of origin. 
Having no nation-state of their own, people from AJK were merged with Pakis-
tanis. On the basis of circumstantial evidence Kashmiri councillors and activists 
presumed that Pakistanis were actually much better off than Kashmiris and that 
the data actually provided a wrong image of the Kashmiris’ social situation. 
According to the narrative of Kashmiri activists, Kashmiris in Britain were 
dominated by Pakistanis although there were presumably many more Kashmiris 
than Pakistanis in the UK. Being better educated and connected with British 
mainstream-society than Kashmiris Pakistanis acted as their representatives in 
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British institutionalised multiculturalism without, however, caring for the needs 
of the Kashmiris. Here, too, the issue of language was significant. In the UK, 
immigrants are entitled to interpreting services, for instance when admitted to 
hospital. The interpreting business was dominated by Pakistanis, too. They of-
fered English-Urdu interpretation which was of little use for many Kashmiris 
who did not know Urdu but spoke Pahari. In the 1990s, Kashmiri activists start-
ed to lobby British institutions for the need to recognise Pahari as a separate lan-
guage and for Pahari language services. This meant, in fact, the recognition of 
Kashmiris as a separate ethnic group, distinct from Pakistanis. 
In a kind of surprise move, some Kashmiri councillors and activists achieved 
the recognition of Kashmiris by the Bradford City Council in late 1998. Pakis-
tanis and pro-Pakistani Kashmiris unsuccessfully attempted to reverse the deci-
sion. To the contrary, more and more British towns and cities with a significant 
population of Kashmiri background followed the example of Bradford and rec-
ognised Kashmiris as a separate ethnic group. In monitoring of council employ-
ment, housing and other issues of local administration Kashmiris became visible. 
Nothing changed, however, in nationally governed policy fields such as educa-
tion and health. Soon after their recognition in Bradford, Kashmiri activists came 
together and started a campaign for the recognition of Kashmiris on a national 
level. This was the Kashmiri National Identity Campaign (KNIC). Many of these 
activists were supporters of the independence of J&K State and were closely re-
lated to groups like JKLF or KWA. Nasreen Ali (2003) therefore discusses the 
KNIC in terms of the Kashmiri nation. This was, however, not the only possible 
reference. I asked KNIC activists whether the word national in the campaign’s 
name referred to the Kashmiri nation or to the British national level. My inter-
locutors told me that the reference to the “national” was deliberately left open 
and vague. The intention of this ambiguity was to avoid the campaign being 
drawn into the antinomies of Kashmiri politics and not to alienate people of 
Kashmiri background who hesitated to support the demand for independence of 
J&K State. 
The KNIC’s purpose was to make “Kashmiri” a category of the British cen-
sus. The census is taken every ten years and the next one was due in 2001. Since 
1991, the census asked for the ethnic self-categorisation.12 For persons of South 
Asian background, “ethnicity” was again categorised in terms of the nation-state 
of origin. Thus, respondents could tick an “Indian” or “Bangladeshi” box but 
there was no “Kashmiri” box. The KNIC demanded the addition of a “Kashmiri” 
tick-box in the 2001 census forms. The Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
                                                           
12  On the inclusion of ethnic categories in the census see Ballard 1996. 
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which carries out the census responded, however, that it was impossible to 
change the questionnaire at a rather short notice. The only option for respondents 
to get Kashmiri ethnicity counted was to tick the box “other ethnic group” and 
then to write “Kashmiri” in the blank space provided beneath. The KNIC at-
tempted to publicise this possibility. The Campaign distributed flyers with titles 
like Kashmiris in Britain – no longer invisible or Be Kashmiri – be counted. 
Through a newsletter published in 2001 people were asked to tick the box “oth-
er” and fill in Kashmiri. The importance of the getting Kashmiri ethnicity count-
ed was explained as follows: 
 
• Kashmiris will be recognised in their own right as equally as any other com-
munity and not be labelled as Indians or Pakistanis depending on which part 
of divided Kashmir they come from. 
• Kashmiris will be able to promote their rich culture, customs and national in-
terests. 
• Local and national institutions will be able to take into account and reflect 
the Kashmiri aspirations and needs in provisions and delivery of services. 
• Government policies will have to recognise and reflect the large Kashmiri 
presence in this country (KNIC Newsletter, issue 1, 2001). 
 
The campaign was opposed by pro-Pakistani Kashmiris, including the UK 
branch of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, the dominant pro-
Pakistani party in AJK, and by British Pakistanis. It was argued that the cam-
paign divided the “Pakistani community” in Britain. In order to publicise the call 
to get counted, the KNIC intended to publish an advertisement in the leading 
Urdu daily in the UK, Jang, which is a branch of the largest-selling Pakistani 
Urdu daily newspaper. But Jang refused to print the advert. In effect, no means 
for the wider circulation of the call were available. 
The campaign largely failed. Little more than 22,000 persons identified 
themselves as ethnic Kashmiris in the census. This was much less than had been 
expected. The number is actually negligible compared to the estimated number 
of 500,000 Kashmiris living in the UK which is regularly quoted by Kashmiri 
activists. After this failure, the campaign became dormant. The issue, however, 
remained pressing for some of the activists. One diagnosis of the failure was that 
it was due to the lack of publicity and media coverage. 
As a consequence, a group of Kashmiris who had been at the forefront of the 
KNIC and who had earlier been related also to the KWA, the JKLF and other 
groups established a Kashmiri satellite TV channel in 2006. The idea of the 
Bradford-based channel was to give Kashmiris their own media voice. The 
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channel was appropriately called Aapna Channel (literally: Own channel). With 
another studio in AJK and correspondents in Indian J&K the intention was to 
create a transnational Kashmiri public sphere. In terms of response to call-in 
programmes and messages from the viewers the response of the British Kashmiri 
public to the channel was quite enthusiastic. Without well-heeded investors and 
sponsors, however, the channel had from the beginning financial problems. In 
AJK, the programme had to be very balanced politically. After just a few days of 
regular transmission, the channel was taken out of the local cable network distri-
bution by the government of AJK because it had aired some critical news item. 
Only after much negotiation the programme could start again in Mirpur. 
After one and a half year in operation, the channel went bankrupt. It was re-
placed by another channel called Kashmir Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), 
based in Manchester and run by largely the same people. Yet KBC, too, broad-
cast for one year only. Thus, a Kashmiri voice in the media was lacking again. 
This was regarded with particular regret when, in view of the next census 
due in 2011, efforts to revive the KNIC were started in 2008. The main actor of 
the KNIC was now Daalat Ali, a long time Kashmiri activist of the Manchester 
area. Daalat Ali had already coordinated the pre-2001 campaign for some time. 
Now, however, it was much more difficult to muster support which was more 
than nominal. While non-Kashmiri organisations like some church groups sup-
ported the Kashmiri claim for national recognition, as did an Early Day Motion 
in the British Parliament,13 less Kashmiris were ready to commit themselves to 
the campaign than ten years earlier. It was not possible to build a similarly strong 
and extensive network. The campaign took more to writing letters to the ONS 
than attempting to create public awareness and pressure. Already in autumn 
2009 the ONS made clear that there would be no “Kashmiri tick-box” in the cen-
                                                           
13  Early Day Motion 1268, initiated by Member of Parliament Linda Riordan and signed 
by 54 MPs in total. The Motion stated: “That this House recognises there is a consid-
erable Kashmir community within the UK and praises the community for its contribu-
tion to the fabric of British life; notes that in previous census returns there has not 
been a separate Kashmiri ethnic group category; therefore calls on the Government to 
give recognition to the 600,000 Kashmiri people estimated to be living in the UK by 
ensuring that the 2011 census return has a separate section for Kashmiri people to 
identify themselves; and looks forward to Kashmiri people living in the UK being able 
to register their identity as the many other ethnic groups that live in the UK are able to 
do.” Available online: http://edmi.parliament.uk/EDMi/EDMDetails.aspx?EDMID= 
35502 (13 October 2010). Early Day Motions are, however, a rather symbolical ele-
ment of British parliamentary culture which does not carry much actual weight. 
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sus questionnaire for 2011. The ONS argued that existing data did not sufficient-
ly support the need for a separate tick-box. As many more groups demanded to 
be included in the census, there would be additional tick-boxes for “Gypsy or 
Irish Traveller” and for “Arab”, but not for Kashmiris. According to the ONS 
there was not sufficient space in the questionnaire for further ethnic tick-boxes. 
This announcement aroused much protest. After negotiations, the ONS final-
ly agreed to carry out a “Kashmiri Research Project” on the census question. 
Two versions of the census forms were randomly mailed out to 27,000 house-
holds in urban areas where a high percentage of “Pakistani” population had been 
recorded by the census of 2001. Half of the forms contained the “Kashmiri” tick-
box while the rest had the “other” tick-box only. The idea was to see whether the 
presence of the “Kashmiri” tick-box in the form would produce a significant dif-
ferent response in self-identification. 
The inclusion of the tick-box had indeed a significant effect: More than four 
times as many respondents identified themselves as “Kashmiri” compared to 
those who had received a questionnaire with the “other” and write-in option on-
ly. With the tick-box, the Pakistani-Kashmiri-ratio decreased from 21.5:1 to 
3.7:1 (see table). 
 
Table 1: Ratios of Pakistanis to Kashmiris in the postal test survey “Kashmiri 
Postal Test areas” (source: ONS 2009. Kashmiri Research Project, p. 16) 






Per cent of people ticking 
Pakistani  
40.8 30.8 
Per cent of people ticking or 
writing in Kashmiri  
1.9 8.4 
Ratio (Pakistani to Kashmiri)  21.5:1 3.7:1 
 
Still, the results also show that either there are many more Pakistanis than 
Kashmiris (which according to other evidence is highly improbable) or that 
many, if not most people from AJK continue to identify themselves as Pakista-
nis, even if they are offered explicit identification as Kashmiris. Analysis of the 
further information elicited showed that there was no significant difference re-
garding indicators like qualification, employment, health, etc. between those 
who ticked “Kashmiri” and those who self-identified as “Pakistani”. The ONS 
concluded that the argument of the KNIC that Kashmiris are more disadvantaged 
than Pakistanis and that therefore social services need to be monitored ethnically 
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was not valid and that accordingly the differentiation of Pakistanis and Kashmir-
is in the census form was unnecessary. Commenting on this argument Daalat Ali 
told me that Kashmiris were effectively compared with Kashmiris (who identi-
fied as Pakistanis) and that therefore effective information on social differences 
was still lacking. Yet also further lobbying did not help. The 2011 Census was 
carried out without the Kashmiri tick-box and only 25,335 persons identified 
themselves as Kashmiri.14 
In the failed campaign, organisations like the JKLF – or similar groups, for 
that matter – did not provide much public support. They had largely lost the 
power to mobilise people. In February 11, 2009, on the anniversary of Maqbool 
Bhat’s execution, I witnessed a demonstration of one JKLF faction in front of 
the Indian High Commission in London. The organisation had called for the 
demonstration in order to demand the relocation of Maqbool Bhat’s remains 
from an unmarked grave in Tihar Jail in Delhi to the Martyrs’ Graveyard in Sri-
nagar, Kashmir. Less than thirty persons followed the call. In the traffic mayhem 
of central London the protestors were hardly discernible. 
 
 
A KASHMIRI DIASPORA IN THE UK? 
 
Considering all this, what can be said about the “Kashmiri diaspora” in Britain? 
The present scene contrasts starkly with the image drawn by Ali, Ellis and Khan 
in their various articles published a decade or more ago. There are activists who 
use the concept Kashmiri diaspora and presuppose that there is a Kashmiri dias-
pora community, even if only a minority of people of Kashmiri background in 
the UK identify themselves (primarily?) as Kashmiris. Yet this “Kashmiri dias-
pora” is much more a political project than a descriptive category of a social 
community. 
The Kashmiri case is quite complex. It supports Brian Axel’s warning 
against conceiving of a diaspora in the first place by linking it to some place of 
origin. “Place of origin” or “home” are very complicated notions in the case of 
Kashmiris. Their “place of origin” is a fragment of a territory that is bitterly dis-
puted in a postcolonial struggle between two much larger powers. Already the 
idea what this “home” is or should be is utterly disputed: Is it a future part of Pa-
kistan, conceived as the nation-state and “home” of Muslims in South Asia? Or 
is it a territory and nation under occupation that needs to be liberated from both 
                                                           
14  See 2011 Census: Table CT0010 Ethnic group (write-in responses), available online at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html (accessed May 24, 2013). 
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India and Pakistan? Political opportunities in Pakistan as well as in AJK are in-
imical to the latter stance. The goal of Kashmiri independence cannot be voiced 
freely and its adherents are strictly excluded from formal political opportunities 
in AJK. In Britain, however, the mobilisation of a Kashmiri diaspora around the 
goal of Kashmiri independence is possible, but also contested. It has to contest 
political perspectives which regard Kashmir as a rightful part of Pakistan. 
Among people of AJK origin in the UK, the goal of ilhaq-e-Pakistan (the merger 
with Pakistan) is not totally dismissed. Pro-Pakistani Kashmiri parties like the 
Muslim Conference have their branches and activities in Britain, too. In contrast 
to the strict opposition in the past, however, Muslim Conference activists, in 
spite of their Pakistan-orientation, nowadays sometimes support the recognition 
of Kashmiris as a separate group in Britain. 
Yet political commitments of Kashmiris in the UK are not limited to what 
may be called “home-issues”. The British multiculturalist system with its con-
cept of community provides political opportunities for Kashmiris. In the UK, 
multiculturalism is largely organised and institutionalised at the municipal level. 
In many cases, local authorities assumed a corporate unity among ethnic minori-
ties and dealt with them through “community leaders” who were themselves in-
terested in conveying an image of unity of the section of the population which 
they claimed to represent (Vertovec 1996).15 This way, multiculturalism came to 
“convey a picture of society as a ‘mosaic’ of several bounded, nameable, indi-
vidually homogeneous and unmeltable minority uni-cultures” (Vertovec 1996: 
51) which are referred to as “communities”.16 The statistical monitoring of 
“communities” at municipal level enables the formal recognition of a group, as 
has been achieved by Kashmiris in many places. So far, however, this recogni-
tion is restricted to municipal affairs only and could not be extended to the na-
tional level. 
Because migrants from Azad Kashmir have settled in a concentrated manner 
in certain towns and cities and because of the British election system Kashmiris 
wield considerable electoral power in these places. There are many Kashmiri 
city councillors now and there is considerable competition for council seats. Yet 
the strong participation in elections engenders a certain fragmentation of the 
“community” along political lines. Fragmentation is augmented by the continu-
ing importance of biraderis. Biraderis are kinship networks based on the norm 
                                                           
15  See Werbner 1991 for the analysis of such “community” politics in Manchester. 
16  Knott (2009) details how British Hindus became a “faith community” largely in re-
sponse to official “community discourse”. 
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of reciprocity.17 The two dominant, rivalling biraderis of people from AJK in 
Britain are Jats and Rajas. Biraderis play an important role among British 
Kashmiris, also in elections, because they are essential for the mobilisation of 
support and votes.18 There is neither an overarching organisational framework 
that binds Kashmiris together as Kashmiris, nor a shared pattern of identity prac-
tices or events which could overcome this fragmentation. 
If we accept that there was a vibrant Kashmiri diaspora community in the 
1990s as described by Ali, Ellis and Khan, the question arises what changes have 
occurred since that time. I see basically three points. First, Ellis and Khan have 
emphasised the role of the insurgency in Indian J&K against Indian rule. After 
the initial phase of strong popular mobilisation, which was mirrored among UK 
Kashmiris, the insurgency led to a long-lasting and brutal war between militant 
Islamist groups and Indian state forces. Diasporic support for the struggle dwin-
dled and fragmented. This is embodied in the fragmentation of the JKLF19 into 
various factions, which often charge each other of being Indian or Pakistani 
agents. Although Indian forces continue their very repressive regime in Jammu 
and Kashmir (Duschinsky 2009, 2010), there is very little commotion among 
British Kashmiris in terms of public protest against the atrocities and solidarity 
with the victims. “Home issues” that arouse action among British Kashmiris, like 
elections, for instance, are mostly limited to issues in AJK.20 It seems that in 
terms of practical action and commitment the idea of a Kashmiri nation which 
includes the whole of the former princely state does not carry very far today.21 
Secondly, in consequence of the ongoing “war against terror” there is a 
strong inclination, especially among the younger generation of Kashmiri origin, 
                                                           
17  Biraderi is a quite complex and ambiguous concept the discussion of which goes 
much beyond the scope of this paper. See Alavi 1972, Ahmad 1977. 
18  For biraderi and politics among British Pakistanis see Akhtar 2013 and Werbner 1989 
who writes about zat which is largely a synonym of biraderi. 
19  Pat Ellis and Zafar Khan’s emphasis of the role of the JKLF may in part also be trig-
gered by the fact that Zafar Khan continues to be an important activist of one of the 
party’s factions. 
20  More precisely, they are mostly limited to the migrants’ areas of origin in southern 
AJK. Until recently, British Kashmiris from Mirpur cared little for what happened in 
AJK’s capital Muzaffarabad, for instance. This changed to some extent through the 
devastating earthquake of 2005 which was followed by strong transnational efforts to 
provide relief (Rehman and Kalra 2006). 
21  This is reciprocated by Valley Kashmiris from the Indian side for most of whom peo-
ple from Mirpur are at best seen as being very marginally “Kashmiri”, if at all. 
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to disregard the more parochial and particularistic identification with a “Kash-
miri nation” in favour of the much more universal identification as Muslims 
(Sökefeld and Bolognani 2011). In the years since I started research, public 
space in the urban areas with considerable Kashmiri/Pakistani population has 
been strongly Islamised, in terms of Islamic banking, Islamic bookshops, cloth-
ing and the like. There is a strong appeal to Muslim solidarity and a feeling that 
Muslims are globally pressurised and put into danger. Young Kashmiris easily 
take out demonstrations against the war in Gaza and for the liberation of Pales-
tine, but at present cannot be mobilised to the same extent for any issue relating 
to Kashmir. Kashmiri independence politics have mostly had a very secularist 
orientation (Sökefeld 2012) which apparently has less appeal today. 
Kashmiri activists formulate a third, interrelated point: There is a lack of 
“Kashmiri consciousness”, especially among the younger generation. Daalat Ali, 
for instance, laments that whenever “home countries” become a topic in English 
schools, young Kashmiris learn about Pakistan and not about Kashmir. Accord-
ing to his diagnosis, British multicultural education neglects and obscures 
Kashmiri history and culture – another consequence of the non-recognition of 
Kashmiris at the British national level. This lack is not balanced by a strong 
transmission of Kashmiri culture and “consciousness” within the families. In-
deed, “being Kashmiri” is mostly a domain of middle-aged and older males. 
Young people and women of all ages were conspicuously absent from the public 
meetings on Kashmiri issues which I attended during my research. 
Thus, although there is at present hardly a Kashmiri diaspora community in 
Britain in the strong and conventional sense of the concept “community” which 
implies unity, closeness and homogeneity and – since Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) 
contrasted “community” with “society” – largely conveys ideas of “interpersonal 
warmth, shared interests, and loyalty” (Baumann 1996: 15)22 there are (male) ac-
tivists who still struggle for the formation and mobilisation of such a communi-
ty; activists who attempt to mobilise people from Kashmir to self-identify as 
Kashmiris and who in their efforts already presuppose the Kashmiri community. 
The Kashmiri diaspora is a kind of community in the making. It is basically a 
discourse produced and sustained by diaspora activists, combined with certain 
(political) practices that intend the institutionalisation of a community. 
Putting the Kashmiri diaspora into question does not mean to negate transna-
tional relations between people from AJK in the UK and people in AJK. It asks, 
however, whether these relations are framed by actors, explicitly or implicitly, as 
                                                           
22  For critical views on community see Cohen 1985, Alleyne 2002, Amit 2002, Amit and 
Rapport 2002. 
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relations among Kashmiris. My emphasis that there is no Kashmiri diaspora 
community in the strong sense of the term does not mean that there are no di-
asporic or transnational relations and commitments by the people that are catego-
rised as “Kashmiri” by Kashmiri activists. There are plenty of such relations and 
commitments in many areas of their lives. Yet these are not necessarily transna-
tional relations as Kashmiris, but, perhaps, as Pakistanis, as Mirpuris, as people 
from Dodiyal or Chakswari village, as Jats or as Rajas, as Muslims, as followers 
of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference or some other party, or simply as 
aapne (“our own”). All these relations produce different social groupings which 
do not conflate in an overarching, inclusive “Kashmiri community”. The distinc-
tion of these diverse diasporic and transnational commitments may perhaps seem 
trivial or pedantic, at first sight. Yet it is not. Only the distinction between differ-
ent lines of relationships and commitments enables us to avoid an essentialist 
conception of diaspora that simply presupposes what needs to be ascertained. It 
enables us not to simply equate activist discourse with social scientific analysis. 
The presence of people from AK in Britain is not a sufficient condition for a 
Kashmiri diaspora. In order to establish such a diaspora successful processes of 
mobilisation are required. Although diaspora is mostly theorised in terms of 
movements and relations across borders, mobilising diaspora implies the con-
struction of boundaries which circumscribe the intended “community”. While 
case studies of diaspora and diaspora theory have mostly focused on the bounda-
ry between the immigrant and the native, non-migrant population,23 the Kashmiri 
case shows that boundaries between different migrant groups may have a partic-
ular significance for the construction of diaspora.24 What is emphasised by 
Kashmiri activists in the UK is the difference and boundary between Kashmiris 
and Pakistanis, not the difference between Kashmiris and native “white” British. 
Significantly, however, this endeavour of boundary-making takes place in an in-
stitutional arena which is provided by the “host” society. The strategy is to de-
mand the recognition of the boundary and the difference between Kashmiris and 
Pakistani by the British institutional structure and not to directly address a Paki-
stani community in the UK.  
 
 
                                                           
23  Cf. the well-known definition of “diaspora” by William Safran (1991). 
24  This is also true for the Alevi case which I studied earlier (Sökefeld 2008). Alevis in 
Germany in the first place point out their difference from Sunni Turkish immigrants 
and emphasise their compatibility with the native German population. For a compari-
son of Alevis and Kashmiris see Sökefeld 2014. 
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CONCEPTUALISING DIASPORA 
 
Focusing on the Kashmiri case, I have outlined an example of a history of mobi-
lising diaspora. Mobilisation has remained limited so far. There is a considerable 
and apparently growing gap between the actual level of mobilisation and the di-
aspora community that is imagined, invoked and claimed by its activists. There 
is no diaspora in the sense of a unified community, an entity, a collective actor. 
Rather, there are claims for and discourses about community (and, significantly, 
its others). Further, there is a great variety of actors, some of whom organise col-
lectively to a certain extent, who establish and keep moving a web of criss-
crossing, sometimes overlapping and often contradicting activities. What light 
does the Kashmiri example throw on the conceptualisation of diaspora? 
First, when we consider processes of social and political mobilisation as a 
necessary condition for diaspora, we have to take into account that mobilisation 
may not only grow but also wane, and, in the last instance, even fail and disap-
pear. Diaspora may be mobilised, but also “de-mobilised” again. Thus, what was 
a thriving, self-conscious community more than a decade ago may today appear 
as a rather forlorn imagination of a few remaining activists. Like other social 
forms, diaspora is not forever. It is dynamic also in the sense that it may expire. 
Second, from an analytical point of view the conventional conceptual twin-
ning of “diaspora” and “community” is highly problematic. It is very prone to 
simply replicating actors’ emic essentialist concepts and perspectives. As I have 
pointed out for the Kashmiri example, although there is hardly a clear-cut, un-
ambiguously outlined diaspora community, there is a multitude of diverse trans-
national, diasporic relationships which are sustained and reproduced by people 
of Kashmiri background. In order to overcome essentialist notions of “communi-
ty” the metaphor of a cloud may help to conceptualise diaspora: What we find is 
“clouds” of dynamic and changing transnational, diasporic relationships which 
partly overlap but sometimes separate, which may concentrate and condense at 
one point but dissolve and vanish at another time. 
Like other social concepts, the concept of diaspora is intended to create order 
in an increasingly complex world. It is used to sort people according to their “or-
igins”, in most cases, and thereby puts those who are apparently out of place 
back into a place. In his book Organizing Modernity, John Law, following Zyg-
munt Bauman (1991), has referred to (social) order as “the dream, or the night-
mare, of modernity” (Law 1994: 2). Law points out that order is, luckily perhaps, 
never fully achieved: “Perhaps there is ordering, but there is certainly no order 
[…] Instead there are more or less precarious and partial accomplishments that 
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may be overturned”, he writes (p. 1f.). John Law turns order into ordering, the 
noun into a verb and the intended product into a process. 
Ordering works through the basic twin operations of exclusion and inclusion 
that attempt to determine who belongs to which category (and in which way) and 
who does not. Yet ultimately, neither inclusion nor exclusion fully achieves its 
goal. There are competing ways of ordering. People sometimes resist being ex-
cluded or included; but sometimes they also do not care. Many “cases” simply 
remain ambivalent. Order is always threatened and challenged by a kind of so-
cial entropy. Order, a neat categorisation of people, is never totally achieved. 
In this sense, diaspora can be considered as an ordering concept. It is used to 
categorise people and to claim or to negate relationships of belonging. It is used 
as such by actors, whether they belong to the claimed diaspora category or not, 
and by social scientists as observers. If we conceive of diaspora as concept of 
ordering (which never, finally, achieves order), we cannot regard diaspora as an 
entity. Instead, diaspora should be viewed as a process. Diaspora is not a com-
munity, except we consider community as a process, too – a social process of at-
tempting to recruit people and to exclude others, of struggling to disseminate 
certain ideas of belonging in the place of others, a process of drawing and chal-
lenging boundaries. Community, like diaspora, is essentially a process of mobili-
sation. Mobilisation may be “hotter” or “cooler”, depending, for instance, on 
how disputed it is, or on the extent to which mobilisation congeals into institu-
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